All case studies
criticalfound in 3 assessments

Unauthenticated SSRF reaching cloud metadata.

Endpoints that fetch a user-supplied URL could be pointed at the cloud provider's internal metadata service.

CloudAPI
Timeline
  1. Discovered (complete)
  2. Proven (complete)
  3. Fixed (not yet published)
  4. Retested (not yet published)

What they were shipping

Multi-tenant developer tooling with webhook and document-link features.

What we found

Endpoints that accept a webhook URL or a document link fetched the remote resource from the backend without validating the destination IP range.

How we proved it

An unauthenticated request pointed the server at the cloud provider's internal metadata service and private address ranges.

Business impact

Instance IAM credentials, container environment variables and internal services never meant to face the internet were within reach.

Fix

Resolve the destination yourself, reject private, loopback and link-local ranges on every resolved address, and connect to the address you validated.

Retest

Retest status not published for this case.

Why it keeps happening

If your backend fetches user-supplied URLs, a scanner won't tell you whether the worker blocks internal addresses. We found this three times in one month, always unauthenticated.

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